



HERTFORDSHIRE  
CONSTABULARY



HERTFORDSHIRE  
POLICE AUTHORITY

# Planning for Major Events & Contingencies Best Value Review

Summary Report  
December 2003

Best Value

# **BEST VALUE REVIEW – PLANNING FOR MAJOR EVENTS AND CONTINGENCIES SUMMARY REPORT**

## **TEAM MEMBERS**

### **Hertfordshire Police Authority**

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### **Hertfordshire Constabulary**

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
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## 1.0 BACKGROUND

- 1.1 Events of '9.11' gave rise to a complete re-think of the meaning and understanding of 'major incidents', not only in magnitude but also in perception. The background and volume potential have given a totally previously unknown range of scenarios to be planned for and those plans tested. Current projection considers that vastly increased resources and training would be required to satisfy the increased range of terrorist tactics now potentially on the menu.
- 1.2 We are now potentially in the arena of having to deal with a 'dirty bomb' and the attendant impact such a scenario would have. Recent mock up tests carried out at the Bank underground station presented us with television coverage which would have seemed unrealistic only a few years ago. Now we have to take on board the possibility of the large scale evacuation of London as well as large numbers of casualties.
- 1.3 The professional and effective handling and co-ordination of the recent rail crashes at Hatfield and Potters Bar, gave the Constabulary and its emergency service partners justification for well deserved praise. To sustain and build on that level of effectiveness, it is vital that reviews such as this look into all aspects of contingency planning, the management skills required to service them and the performance of the Force's personnel and systems which could be opened to public scrutiny in a potentially untested arena.
- 1.4 It must be recognised from the inception of this review that the Constabulary benefits from having many skilled and experienced practitioners in both slow and fast time events. This review gives the opportunity to build on their experience and knowledge.
- 1.5 This review also links into the Constabulary's handling of major events, the management of which requires a similar level of planning and professionalism from its personnel.
- 1.6 The figure below shows the activity flowchart followed in the course of a major event/incident:

*Fig 1 : The process.*



## 2.0 REVIEW OBJECTIVE

2.1 The objective of the review is:

*“To improve the quality of response to spontaneous and pre-planned events by providing an efficient, effective and timely service to enhance public safety ”*

By:

- Ensuring staff are appropriately trained and experienced
- Maximising the understanding of roles and responsibilities through effective communication
- Maximising the use of facilities and resources available to the Constabulary
- Developing and expanding successful partnerships

2.2 This review will help develop the ‘building blocks’ for dealing with all types of critical/major incident, but acknowledgement is given that this report focuses upon the ‘policing’ element of the response to a planned event or spontaneous incident rather than a holistic multi-agency viewpoint.

2.3. Although the areas that this review has covered (training, communication, resources & partnerships) are all applicable at any level of event or incident (what changes is the ‘scale’ to which the Constabulary responds, dependent upon the event) the review findings within the report are seen in the context of planned and unplanned incidents (such as the Robbie Williams concert and Potters Bar train crash) rather than dealing with catastrophic incident such as 9/11.

2.4 A major/critical incident will always require a joint response with public service partners (health, fire & rescue etc) and as such this review considers the role of Hertfordshire Emergency Services Major Incident Committee (HESMIC) and the Constabulary's contribution to the partnership.

## 3.0 METHODOLOGY

- Challenge – why does the Constabulary do this work at all? How does it contribute to effective policing?
- Consult – what do the public and the staff think of the area being reviewed? How do they think it can be improved?
- Compare – how does Hertfordshire’s service compare with others and, in particular, with best practice?
- Compete/Collaboration – who should provide this service – Hertfordshire staff or someone else? One service provider over an alternative. Who gives best value?

## 4.0 IMPROVEMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### RECOMMENDATION A – TRAINING

<b>Recommendation A :</b>	
<p>To ensure that the Constabulary has the relevant numbers of officers trained and experienced at all levels to deal with critical and major incidents, and major sporting events by:</p>	
<p><b>Action 1:</b> The appointment of a training co-ordinator to re-align senior officer and practitioner level training, and cascade information to ensure adequate management of critical and major incidents. The training co-ordinator must as matter or urgency establish and co-ordinate a centralised database containing specialist skills in relation to dealing with major/critical/planned events.  <b>Costs:</b> 1 x A4 (£26,269) or Sergeant (£40,406)  <b>Measurement:</b> The appointment of a Training Co-ordinator.</p>	<p>Completed by 01/06/04.</p>
<p><b>Action 2:</b> Implementing a system to ensure that all-public order training capacity is used, and ensuring that trained senior officers regularly attend level 2 PSU training. 80% of all appropriate staff PSU trained by target date.  <b>Costs:</b> Absorbed within operational costings.  <b>Measurement:</b> Determine the optimum training package to deliver on Critical Incident Training and deliver to the target audience.</p>	<p>Completed by ASAP for training capacity. 1/4/04 level 2 PSU.</p>
<p><b>Action 3:</b> Ensuring that all shadowing and secondment opportunities are explored and utilised.  <b>Costs:</b> Absorbed within operational costings.  <b>Measurement:</b> Through liaison with Ops Support, deliver Public Order training to maximum capacity across all ranks and roles.</p>	<p>Completed by 31/12/04</p>
<p><b>Action 4:</b> Critical incident policy developed for the force. Management of specific roles for critical and major incidents is aligned with the on-call rota.  <b>Costs:</b> Absorbed within operational costings.  <b>Measurement:</b> Determine best opportunities for shadowing and secondment opportunities to satisfy a recognised training path and deliver to all cadre officers.</p>	<p>Completed by 31/12/04</p>

## RECOMMENDATION B – COMMUNICATION

<b>Recommendation B :</b>	
To ensure that the Force communication infrastructures support operational needs by the development and understanding of the following:	
<p><b>Action 1:</b> Reviewing the protocol for contingency and operational planning responsibilities. <b>Costs:</b> Absorbed within operational costings. <b>Measurement:</b> The publication and acceptance of an agreed protocol.</p>	Completed by 30/03/04
<p><b>Action 2:</b> The production of publications for the support structure for the roles of Silver and Bronze. <b>Costs:</b> Absorbed within operational costings. <b>Measurement:</b> Publication and testing of Silver and Bronze support documents.</p>	Completed by 31/12/04
<p><b>Action 3:</b> Transfer all contingency plans to an electronic system. <b>Costs:</b> Additional Police Staff Post (A3 – 6 month contract) £9,610 <b>Measurement:</b> The conversion of contingency plans from hard copy to electronic format.</p>	Completed by 31/12/04
<p><b>Action 4:</b> Ensuring that the Constabulary’s business continuity measures are effective for both the command team and the County Control Room. <b>Costs:</b> Absorbed within operational costings. <b>Measurement:</b> The personal identification of an alternative Command together with a training module to familiarise them with Hertfordshire procedures and systems. The effective and documented testing of alternative command and control sites.</p>	Completed by 31/12/04
<p><b>Action 5:</b> Ensure that all staff and line managers are fully aware of their health and safety responsibilities including an awareness of the occupational health unit’s facilities. <b>Costs:</b> Absorbed within operational costings. <b>Measurement:</b> Identify and deliver through suitable media an awareness of OH functions available. Monitor the number of referrals to OH department.</p>	Completed by 31/03/04
<p><b>Action 6:</b> Fully utilising the technical capabilities available in force for major incident management. (AIMS). <b>Costs:</b> Absorbed within operational costings. <b>Measurement:</b> Determine the costings to link and deliver AIMS as part of the OASIS command and control system. If feasible, train sufficient operators to deliver in the event of a Major Incident. If not feasible, research to obtain a system which can deliver the capabilities required. Test system in a controlled training exercise environment.</p>	Completed by 31/12/04

## RECOMMENDATION C - RESOURCES

<b>Recommendation C :</b>	
To maximise the facilities and resources available to the Constabulary by:	
<p><b>Action 1:</b> Ensuring that organisational resilience is achieved to satisfy the long-term needs of a major incident by having the appropriate equipment available to use as required.</p> <p><b>Costs:</b> £80,000-£100,000 (forward command vehicle)</p> <p><b>Measurement:</b> Replacement of Forward Command Vehicle. Determination of appropriate locations for storing Major Incident Boxes. Determine content and supply 'grab packs' for each role at a Major Incident. Identify and train staff for each specific 'grab pack' role.</p>	Completed by 31/12/04
<p><b>Action 2:</b> Evaluating operational resilience presented by reviewing alternative resource sources.</p> <p><b>Costs:</b> Absorbed within operational costings.</p> <p><b>Measurement:</b> To cost resourcing opportunities presented by voluntary groups, private companies and mutual aid and deliver a business case.</p>	Completed by 31/12/04
<p><b>Action 3:</b> Publish a major event manager's document for all front line supervisors and senior management.</p> <p><b>Costs:</b> Absorbed within operational costings.</p> <p><b>Measurement:</b> Training Co-ordinator to obtain best practice available (from Metropolitan Police and Cleveland Constabulary), produce the relevant document and deliver at the training for Critical Incidents (See Recommendation A : Action 1) .</p>	Completed by 31/12/04

## RECOMMENDATION D – PARTNERSHIPS

<b>Recommendation D :</b>	
To continue to manage and develop successful partnerships to assist the Constabulary's capacity to manage major and critical incidents by:	
<p><b>Action 1:</b> Continuing to retain close working relationships with HESMIC.</p> <p><b>Costs:</b> Absorbed within operational costings.</p> <p><b>Measurement:</b> The adoption of the Training Co-ordinator on to the HESMIC Training Committee.</p> <p>The formation of a specific Training Co-ordinating Group to fully support Critical and Major Incident training.</p>	Completed by 31/12/04
<p><b>Action 2:</b> To publish the annual timetable to reflect participation and roles of all partners.</p> <p><b>Costs:</b> Absorbed within operational costings.</p> <p><b>Measurement:</b> Production of an annual timetable of activity which links in non-emergency service partners to a recognised training programme.</p>	Completed by 31/12/04
<p><b>Action 3:</b> Consulting with neighbouring forces to evaluate the financial viability of a multi – functional training establishment to cater for: Dogs, Firearms, Public order and CBRN training.</p> <p><b>Costs:</b> Viability of a multi - functional training centre requires costing against regional training requirements.</p> <p><b>Measurement:</b> The delivery of a business case to sustain such a bid or otherwise.</p>	Completed by 31/12/04

## 5.0 RESEARCH FINDINGS

The review identified opportunities to make step change improvements as follows:

### 5.1 TRAINING

<i>'Where we are now'</i>	<i>'Where do we want to be'</i>
Training is constrained at senior management level; there is limited critical incident training at 1st line supervisor level; no apparent recorded path to follow to achieve effective command of major events.	Training managed by re-alignment of senior officer and practitioner level training. Information is cascaded to ensure standardised management of critical and major incidents.
Public order training is not always fully utilised; senior officer public order refresher training not co-ordinated; no requirement for senior officers to re-qualify on a regular basis.	A system is in place to ensure that all-public order training capacity is used. That trained senior officers regularly attend level 2 PSU training.
A recognised and accredited training path to attain experience does not exist.	All shadowing and secondment opportunities are explored and utilised.
Resilience in command experience is limited at certain times.	Management of specific roles possess appropriate command skills and experience.

5.1.1 All the different areas of activity mentioned above, in particular Critical Incident Handling, appear to lack any form of central control in the provision of adequate or structured training.

5.1.2 The varying departments contribute very well but, in many cases, in isolation when it comes to the provision and documentation of training provided or required for individual roles. This inevitably indicates that officers need more support in available training, as has been evidenced by staff surveys. There is an immediate need to incorporate the role of Training Co-ordinator into the current structure to give direction to the training of Major/critical incident and event management. As has been mentioned above, Critical Incident Management has apparently been unsupported in the following areas:

- There is no recognised force wide definition of the term 'Critical Incident'
- Training is restricted to a few inserts in some courses
- PS / Inspector ranks are generally young in service with the resultant shortage of experience

This does not mean per se that service delivery is seriously impacted, merely that there is no apparent commonality of delivery or recording.

Events which could rightly be classified as 'Critical Incidents' occur on a regular basis and as such, should be seen as an area where the training of young and inexperienced supervisors is paramount. Training of management staff and front line supervisors in managing Critical Incidents would go much of the way to satisfying 'major incident' management, as many of the management actions are generic.

**(Recommendation A: Action 1)**

5.1.3 The most regular large crowd event which the Constabulary deals with is football matches at Watford F.C. and as has been discussed in more depth in the appendices, there are many issues concerning:

- Recognised levels of command training
- Shadowing opportunities
- Proper use of PSU resources

5.1.4 Many of these issues link into frequency and validity of training, not only for senior officers but also for Level 2 officers. There is a loss of training opportunity on many refresher courses which must be addressed to ensure the Force is able to deploy fully trained and competent officers. Much work is already ongoing on this issue to achieve 100% attendance.

**(Recommendation A: Action 2).**

5.1.5 The positive aspect of specialist training within the terms of this review (Major Events and Contingency Planning) is the high level of recognition placed on the standard and frequency of training by units such as:

- Dog Section
- Firearms Unit
- Search Teams
- Public Order

5.1.6 There are standing protocols in place, which see Dogs and Firearms Units work and train regularly with their neighbouring forces, enabling an active cross-border co-operation.

5.1.7 The relatively small number of Major Incidents, major events or large crowd football matches gives limited opportunity to gain active operational experience. There is a perceived need to have a structured and accredited training path which would enable individuals to progress through a specific learning curve to ensure the individual and the Force was safeguarded in the event of any subsequent litigation or major event. There is a need to incorporate into the structured training path, the opportunity to shadow and be seconded to similar events to gain experience. The proximity of Hertfordshire to London means that opportunities to shadow should be accessible by working in partnership with the Metropolitan Police.

**(Recommendation A: Action 3).**

5.1.8 The current 'Senior Officer On Call' system utilises the services of senior managers to cover incidents relating to :

- Firearms incidents
- Public Order
- PACE

5.1.9 This cadre represents a very experienced nucleus of the Constabulary's senior management. This works on a 6 monthly rotational basis and provides an ideal opportunity for expansion to ensure a continued and larger pool of experience.

5.1.10 As opportunities for hands-on experience is limited as previously mentioned, a larger amount of trained senior officers would seriously restrict opportunity for experience as well as having a serious impact on training and re-training. It is apparent that this finite number should be determined to enable the programme to be initiated.


**(Recommendation A: Action 4).**

## 5.2 COMMUNICATION

<i>'Where we are now'</i>	<i>'Where do we want to be'</i>
Responsibility for contingency and operational planning is based on a series of historical and local considerations.	The protocol defining area and headquarter contingency and operational planning responsibilities is made unambiguous and is adhered to.
Detailed explanations of the support structure for the roles of Silver and Bronze require definition.	Publications for the support structure at all command levels are circulated and tested.
Contingency plans are largely available in hard copy format, which is not user friendly.	Contingency plans held electronically and are accessible, with an alternative back up.
Defined CCR business continuity measures are awaiting approval. Command team resilience measures are undefined.	Business continuity measures are effective from both CCR and command team perspectives.
Variable awareness of health and safety responsibilities. Inconsistent use of the occupational health unit's facilities.	Line managers are fully aware and manage all their health and safety responsibilities, including possessing an awareness of the OHU.
OASIS command and control system is not used to its full extent.	Fully co-ordinated systems within OASIS utilised, incorporating Action and Information

- 5.2.1 The review found that although a protocol existed for defining responsibilities between area and headquarters when considering contingency and response planning, the protocol allowed significant interpretation. This protocol needs to be developed to ensure that it is clear and unambiguous in order that contingency and response planning is undertaken in a consistent manner across the Constabulary.  
**(Recommendation B: Action 1)**
- 5.2.2 There is a requirement to ensure that all individuals are aware of roles and responsibilities in the event of critical and major incidents. The command and control system therefore, still requires some supporting definition and testing to ensure that command resilience is achieved.  
**(Recommendation B: Action 2).**
- 5.2.3 The current system of retaining contingency plans on hard copy is not user friendly or efficient. Best practice suggests that electronic storage is more effect and more easily accessible.  
**Recommendation B: Action 3).**
- 5.2.4 The Constabulary must ensure that its business continuity measures are effective in order to resume command and control in the event of a CCR failure, or an event resulting in an absence of the command team. These contingency systems require detailed planning and testing to ensure effective execution.  
**(Recommendation B: Action 4)**
- 5.2.5 While briefing as a communication forum works effectively within the Hertfordshire Constabulary, there is some evidence to suggest that within the de-briefing process health and safety issues are not consistently addressed by managers. In order to ensure the well being of the individuals involved in major and critical incidents all health and safety legislation and guidance must be communicated and complied with.  
**(Recommendation B: Action 5)**
- 5.2.6 In order to maximise the level of efficiency with which the Force responds to major events, all technical capabilities must be utilised to increase the effectiveness of command and control. Therefore, operational requirements should be analysed against system capabilities to ensure that technological solutions are aligned with organisational needs.  
**(Recommendation B: Action 6).**

## 5.3 RESOURCES



5.3.1 Herts Constabulary is moving on apace to replace ageing and ineffective equipment in many areas of 'command and control';

- The replacement Forward Command Vehicle is being researched with a view to purchase when the appropriate specifications are identified.
- An equipment trailer has been purchased and is in the process of being fully equipped. A system has been put in place and tested to ensure it can be delivered to site within the first hour of an incident.
- The public order equipment is up to date and fully functional.

5.3.2 Major Incident boxes have suffered from a lack of dedicated ownership and support, resulting in them being, in general, under-resourced and ill equipped. They are located at sites consistent with previous geographically aligned divisions. There is a need to re-equip, re-align both in location and responsibility and provide 'grab packs' for each role involved at a major incident.


**(Recommendation C: Action 1).**

5.3.3 It was apparent following the train crashes at Hatfield and Potters Bar that resource resilience was a major issue for the Force which had to deal with a long term, geographically demanding incident. The review researched the financial viability of outsourcing issues such as cordon control and site security. It established that outsourced resources would be more costly than Police offers but a case could be made dependent upon the opportunity cost of using officers for other duties. There are also considerations when using outsourced personnel in respect of powers and Health and Safety issues.

**(Recommendation C: Action 2).**

- 5.3.4 With the exception of the 'patrolling officers handbook 'and some aide memoir cards, there seems to be very little corporate documentation circulated to enable first line supervisors to have a formalised system to deal with a major/critical incidents, particularly in respect of the 'golden hour'. A precise and targetted 'Major Event managers' pack should be produced for all front line supervisors and senior management.  
**(Recommendation C: Action 3).**

**5.4 PARTNERSHIPS**



- 5.4.1 Partnership working under the direction of the Hertfordshire Emergency Services Committee (HESMIC), is a highly co-ordinated and sophisticated system ensuring effective training, consultation and ultimately co-ordinated deployment of resources. The training scenarios led by HESMIC are to be actively supported. The force should build on its own identified best practice and consider learning from other forces to continue to develop its partnership working to ensure that partnerships continue to efficiently deliver highly co-ordinated responses to both spontaneous and pre planned events.  
**(Recommendation D: Action 1).**

- 5.4.2 Training is well received and supportive at senior manager level. There is an opportunity to enter into an annual timetable which all partners share and own, enabling a more comprehensive and geographically based test arena.  
**(Recommendation D: Action 2).**

- 5.4.3 While the requirement for a training centre has been principally recognised by numerous regional forces, it requires specific analysis to identify exact requirements and costing. This facility would prove valuable when training the various specialist teams together.  
**(Recommendation D: Action 3).**

## 6.0 CONCLUSION

- 6.1 It must be recognised that Hertfordshire Constabulary and its personnel are actually ‘ahead of the game’ in many areas of this review. Issues have long been recognised and efforts are being strenuously made to put remedial systems in place on an ever changing playing field. The nature of Policing will remain largely reactive in the use of resources and it is not always possible to set realistic timetables for change when competing demands require more immediate action and priority.
- 6.2 To look at major incidents with the hindsight of Hatfield and Potters Bar actually reflects the abilities which staff showed over long periods. Whilst ‘9.11’ has without doubt changed the face of what could be encountered in the guise of a major incident it would be wrong to lose sight of the fact that on the roads of Hertfordshire in any one year, statistics reveal that there are around 50 fatalities. The county’s response to these tragic events is always highly professional and, without doubt, consistent.
- 6.3 The main issues which require activity in the opinion of this review are;
- Training of all supervisors in the handling of critical and major incidents.
  - The alignment of training to a training co-ordinator.
  - A structured and accredited training path for major events
  - Transferring contingency plans to an electronic system.
  - Utilising Software to enhance major incident management.
- 6.4 The timetable for success in these areas will be determined by the priority placed on recognition of the issues and the momentum produced to deliver what, in some cases, will be an expensive and time-consuming process. They will without doubt reap the benefits of improvement both short and long term in the Constabulary’s ability to:
- Maximise command and control capacity.
  - Increase the profile of critical incidents as a defined and understood concept.
  - Increase the accessibility and knowledge of contingency plans.